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a b s t r a c t
Purpose: The COVID-19 pandemic has presented challenges to delivering safe and timely care for cancer
patients. The oncology community has undertaken substantial workflow adaptations to reduce transmission risk for patients and providers. While various control measures have been proposed and implemented, little is known about their impact on safety of the radiation oncology workflow and potential
for transmission. The objective of this study was to assess potential safety impacts of control measures
employed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Methods: A multi-institutional study was undertaken to assess the risks of pandemic-associated workflow adaptations using failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). Failure modes were identified and
scored using FMEA formalism. FMEA scores were used to identify highest-risk aspects of the radiation
therapy process. The impact of control measures on overall risk was quantified. Agreement among institutions was evaluated.
Results: Thirty three failure modes and 22 control measures were identified. Control measures resulted in
risk score reductions for 22 of the failure modes, with the largest reductions from screening of patients
and staff, requiring use of masks, and regular cleaning of patient areas. The median risk score for all failure modes was reduced from 280 to 168. There was high institutional agreement for 90.3% of failure
modes but only 47% of control measures.
Conclusions: COVID-related risks are similar across oncology practices in this study. While control measures can reduce risk, their use varied. The effectiveness of control measures on risk may guide selection
of the highest-impact workflow adaptions to ensure safe care in oncology.
Ó 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Radiotherapy and Oncology xxx (2020) xxx–xxx

The COVID-19 pandemic has posed serious challenges for the
delivery of quality care in healthcare systems. This is acutely felt
in the oncology setting, where patients are a high-risk population
often being older or challenged with significant comorbidities
and having systematic immunosuppression due to treatments.
Cancer patients and those with a cancer history have been found
to be at serious risk for complications and death from this disease
[1–3], and also may be more vulnerable to contracting the disease,
with as much as a two-fold elevated risk [4]. This small-number
study has been confirmed in a survey of 17 million adults in the
UK suggesting that a history of cancer is a significant risk factor
for increased mortality in patients hospitalized for COVID-19 [2].
Nosocomial transmission (i.e. originating in a hospital setting) is
a particular concern with emerging viruses, and has been described
⇑ Corresponding author at: 1959 NE Pacific St, Seattle, WA 98105, USA.
E-mail address: nvisc@uw.edu (N. Viscariello).

[5]. Radiation oncology is of particular interest because patients
often undergo extended treatments and are in close contact with
staff for positioning, heightening the potential for nosocomial
transmission. Due to the concerns of poor outcome and inherent
susceptibility of cancer patients to COVID-19, bringing cancer
patients to the hospital for daily radiation therapy treatments must
be done in a carefully controlled environment that limits the
potential for viral transmission.
Given the potential impact on oncology patients, it is especially
important to understand and control the risks associated with
COVID-19. One challenge to this is the rapid evolution of the pandemic. In January 2020, the World Health Organization classified
COVID-19 as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
By March 11, the disease was classified as a pandemic. In the US,
the first reported case of COVID-19 was on January 19th in
Washington state. As of this writing, in June 2020, the number of
confirmed cases in the US approaches 2 million and number of
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modes is compiled, along with their possible causes and effects.
For each failure mode, the team provides scores for each of three
criteria: Occurrence, Severity, and Detectability. Each variable is
scored on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most likely to
occur (O), the most severe (S), or the least detectable (D), respectively. The product of O, S, and D produces a Risk Priority Number
(RPN) which assigns a number to the perceived risk of each failure
mode. Failure modes with the highest RPN represent steps in the
process where interventions or control measures should be prioritized to reduce risk.
In this study, an FMEA was used to identify the ways in which
radiation oncology departments may respond to the COVID-19
pandemic. In particular, it assessed the potential effectiveness of
new procedures and viral control measures utilized in several radiation therapy departments across the United States. Six institutions participated in this study, representing diverse geographical
regions of the US and areas of different COVID-19 case numbers
during the pandemic (supplementary table A). Each group participated in the FMEA processes and assessment of control measures.

deaths has exceeded 100,000 (Fig. 1) [6]. This rapid evolution
makes it difficult to navigate a response and provide quality care
for cancer patients. The medical community has responded quickly
with guidance and sharing of experiences, including sharing institutional [7–12] or national experiences [13–15], pandemic-focused
oncology treatment recommendations [16–23], recommendations
for prevention of nosocomial transmission in oncology clinics
[24,25], and an exploration of the impact of the pandemic on radiation oncology practices [26–28]. While the literature on this topic
is extensive and growing, to our knowledge there has not been a
formal evaluation to assess risk or to measure the potential impact
of existing recommendations in the radiation oncology practice.
This is a natural place for radiation oncology to contribute, as formal risk assessment tools like failure mode and effects analysis
(FMEA) are often used in this specialty and radiation oncology professionals are experienced with these techniques [29–31].
The purpose of this study is to perform a multi-institutional
assessment of risks related to COVID-19 workflow adaptations in
radiation oncology clinics and to evaluate the potential impact of
associated control measures on safety of the radiation therapy process as well as the potential for nosocomial transmission. The goal
is to quantify the effectiveness of the various control measures and
workflow adaptations associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and
also to describe a framework for adapting these measures to new
situations or for evaluating potential new measures.

Control measures
Throughout the pandemic, many changes to the hospital-wide
and radiation therapy specific processes were made to help reduce
the spread of the virus (Fig. 1 from one center in this study). Such
changes included the implementation of telehealth visits, requirements for face masks for all staff and visitors, and patient screening. In this study, new processes (e.g. universal masking) or novel
adaptations of existing processes (e.g., telehealth visits) are considered ‘‘control measures.” A list of control measures was identified
by the participating institutions, which was cross-checked against
control measures discussed in a subsequent ASTRO survey in late
April 2020 [26]. All of the control measures identified in that survey were also found in the present study.

Methods
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a risk-assessment tool that can be used to prospectively
identify weaknesses in a process. FMEA is used in manufacturing
and systems engineering and has been widely used in healthcare
[32–34]. Its use for radiation oncology has been outlined in the
American Association of Physicists in Medicine (AAPM’s) Task
Group 100 report [31]. FMEA provides a systematic way to evaluate the steps of a process, identify the magnitude of risk associated
with each step, and develop interventions to improve the process.
An FMEA is performed by identifying a process map and visualizing components of the process with a multidisciplinary team. At
each step in the process map, challenges that may lead to errors or
potential unsafe conditions are identified. Each of the ways that the
workflow can fail is called a failure mode. A list of these failure

Failure Mode Identification and Scoring
In order to assess the safety impact of each new control measure, an FMEA was undertaken using the methodology described
previously. A process map for a patient undergoing radiation therapy treatment was developed with an interprofessional team at the
Department of Radiation Oncology at institution A of this study,
including nurses, physicians, physicists, and therapists.

Fig. 1. Number of confirmed coronavirus cases and deaths in the US over time. Relevant infection control measures at institution A of this study were implemented at the
various times shown.
2
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Table 1
Description of the 10-point scales used to generate risk priority numbers for each failure mode.
Severity (S)

Occurrence (O)

Detectability (D)

1–2

Minimal effect on patient or staff

Has not been seen during the pandemic, but is
possible

Easily detected, >90% chance of being caught

3–4

Unlikely to cause infection or reduced care quality

Seen at least once during pandemic

Easy to detect with multiple checks

5

Likely increased chance of infection or reduced
care quality

Seen several times during the pandemic

5% chance of being caught

6–8

Highly likely to cause infection or reduced care
quality

Seen approximately once a week during the
pandemic

Very difficult to detect

9–10

Certain to cause infection or reduced care quality

Has happened with almost all patients

Almost impossible to detect, 0.1% chance of
being caught

list of 33 failure modes is included as supplementary table B. Failures modes were found to fall into two categories: infection spread
(n = 22) and changes to quality of care (n = 11). Those with the
highest RPNs related to failures in infection control. Examples
included viral transmission from asymptomatic staff and patients
present in the department, lack of proper cleaning of common
areas, and patient and staff non-disclosure of symptoms. Fig. 2
illustrates the range of RPN scores for all failure modes listed in
Table 1, with reduction in risk score demonstrated for 22/33 control measures. RPN values both before control measures and procedures were in place as well as after are shown. For most failure
modes, the control measures and interventions reduced the risk
score. The median RPN changed from 280 (interquartile range:
54–560) to 168 (interquartile range: 50–224). However, for the
lowest-scoring failure modes, the RPN tended to stay the same or
increase slightly. For example, implementing telehealth visits can
have negative effects on care quality or accessibility, as in failure
modes 21 and 22.
There was high agreement across all six institutions for 30 of 33
failure modes, meaning that similar issues arise in different clinical
environments. The 3 failure modes with a lower institutional consensus score were related to issues of patient communication. For
example, some institutions relied on the patient to carry a piece of
paper with their screening status or to read all informational material given to them, whereas other institutions did not require these
behaviors of their patients.
As shown in Table 3, 21 control measures in response to the
pandemic were identified. 38% of the changes in policies and procedures applied to all patients within the department. In Fig. 2, the
effects of all control measures on the RPN scores are illustrated. To
determine which control measures represent the greatest risk
reduction, the relative risk reduction score is shown in Table 3.
The largest risk reduction was from the following measures: initial
screening of patients, regular cleaning of patient areas, and requiring masks.
Each institution was asked to score the control measure on relevance to their site of practice. The measures were stratified into 3
levels of agreement across clinics. Those that applied to <2 clinics
were considered to have low institutional consensus. A medium
institutional consensus score corresponds to 3–4 sites, and high
is 5–6 sites. The control measures with the highest institutional
agreement also had the highest relative risk reduction (Fig. 3).

Potential failure modes were identified from this process map.
The severity, occurrence, and detectability of each failure mode
were determined by institutional consensus. The scales for scoring
each failure mode are shown in Table 1. This follows a ten-point
scale commonly used in FMEA [31] but with changes made to
reflect the COVID-related practices considered in this investigation.
The risks focused on were impact on quality of cancer care and the
potential for viral transmission. The RPN for each failure mode was
calculated by multiplying the individual scores. RPNs were then
used to rank each failure mode.
The failure modes and control measures were initially developed at one center and were then evaluated by the five other institutions participating in this study. Each institution evaluated
which failure modes were relevant in their practice and which control measures were in place. Additions to the initial lists were also
made. Additionally, each institution provided feedback on each
failure mode as well as their own scoring of each failure mode.
An institutional consensus score was generated for each item. This
score ranges from 1 to 6, where a 1 indicates that this is relevant
only at one institution and a 6 means that all collaborators had a
similar failure mode or control measure.
To quantify the impact of implementing control measures on
overall risk, the failure modes were scored twice using the FMEA
methodology: first as if no preventative actions were in place
and second with all of the control measures in place. For each control measure, the number of failure modes it impacted was
assessed. In addition, to determine the impact of each control measure on the overall risk, a relative risk reduction score was defined.
This was motivated by the fact that the number of failure modes
that are affected with each control measure does not alone indicate
that control measure’s potential impact on risk. For example, a particular control measure may affect many failure modes, but those
failure modes may be relatively low-risk so the impact may be
minor. On the other hand, a particular control measure may affect
only a few failure modes but those failure modes may be high-risk
so the expected impact is large. We, therefore, also report a relative
risk reduction score. The relative risk reduction score was calculated as the sum of RPNs for each affected failure mode divided
by the total risk budget (defined as the sum of RPNs for all possible
failure modes). A higher relative risk reduction score indicates that
the control measure has a higher potential impact on the overall
risk. A score of one would mean that the control measure affects
all potential failure modes.

Discussion
Results
Given that cancer patients appear to be at increased risk for
contracting COVID [4] and for experiencing negative outcomes
from the disease [2], it is important to control the clinical environment in such a way as to reduce nosocomial viral transmission and

A list of 33 failure modes were identified in the radiation therapy workflow for patients during the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 2
shows the ten failure modes with the highest RPN scores. The full
3
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Table 2
Failure modes identified for the radiation therapy process during COVID-19. Risk scores are S, severity, O, Occurrence, and D, detectability for an overall risk priority number
(RPN). Institutional consensus is the number of institutions (out of 6) at which each failure mode applies. Failure modes are arranged ordinally and correspond to Fig. 2 from
highest to lowest RPN. Starred rows indicate failure modes whose control measure implementation increased or did not impact RPN.
Failure
Mode
Rank

Failure Mode

Cause

Effect

S

O

D

RPN

Institutional
Consensus

1

Infectious person not caught at
initial screening

Person is asymptomatic

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious person

7

8

8

448

6

2

Infectious person not caught at
initial screening

Person is unclear about symptoms or mistakes it for
a chronic condition, treatment effect, etc.

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious person

7

6

8

336

6

3

Waiting/changing room not cleaned
routinely

No policy is in place, Lack of cleaning supplies or
staff

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious patient

6

6

9

324

6

4

Infectious person arrives at
department with unknown symptom
status

Patient or staff is unclear about what constitutes
exposure to a positive person

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious patient

7

5

8

280

6

5

Infectious person arrives at
department with unknown symptom
status

Visual marker for screened status not used (piece of
paper, sticker)

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious patient

7

4

9

252

2

6

Infectious person not caught at
initial screening

Initial hospital and department entry screening not
effective, person enters from unsecured entrance

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious person

7

4

8

224

6

7

Infectious person not caught at
initial screening

Guidelines for symptoms were unclear and
changing

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious person

7

4

8

224

6

8

Infectious patient arrives at
department with unknown symptom
status

Arrival instructions (e.g., letter from patient care
coordinator) given to patient are not read

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious patient

7

4

8

224

3

9

Infectious staff member arrives at
department

Staff screening not implemented, not effective

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious staff

7

4

8

224

6

10

Treatment or exam room is not
disinfected after patient is treated

No procedure in place, clinical staff is not compliant

Patient or staff exposure
from infectious patient

8

3

9

216

6

Fig. 2. Failure mode risk scores (RPN, risk priority number) before and after control measures were implemented.

depends on what measures are employed and how reliable they
are.
There are several interesting and unexpected findings in this
report. First, some of the most effective measures that reduce risk
were those that limited the spread of the virus from asymptomatic
patients or staff. Examples include requiring the use of masks for
all staff and patients, regular cleaning of rooms, and having
patients use hand sanitizer before entering rooms and after leav-

maintain the quality of care. Experience in China demonstrated
that the institution of control measures prevented staff and patient
infection despite high community prevalence [35]. The present
report provides a framework for further understanding this. It suggests that there is good agreement among institutions regarding
which processes have the greatest risk of nosocomial transmission.
It also suggests that the control measures currently in place can
substantially reduce risk, though the magnitude of risk reduction
4
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Table 3
Control measures in response to COVID-19. The relative risk reduction assesses the impact of each control measure on the overall risk. Institutional consensus represents the
number of institutions (out of 6) in which each control measure is in use. Asterisks indicate control measures with 90% compliance in a survey from late April 2020 of 222
radiation oncology leaders in the US [22].
Label

Applies to

Measure

# of failure
modes affected

Relative Risk
Reduction

Institutional
Consensus

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9

All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All

Screening at clinic front desk
Screening at hospital entrance, limit access points
Pre-RT COVID testing
Sanitizer on entry/exit of treatment room
Masks required in all areas of the hospital
Social distancing, waiting rooms rearranged and decluttered
Screening call from nurse prior to arrival
Telehealth visits offered
Visitors limited to 1 person

8
7
7
6
6
6
4
4
2

0.52
0.46
0.40
0.38
0.36
0.31
0.25
0.02
0.13

5*
6
2
5
4
6*
4
2
2*

S1
S2
S3
S4

Staff
Staff
Staff
Staff

Staff in surgical masks in patient areas
Telework for staff highly encouraged
Staff screening, self-assessment, and testing if indicated
Staff training on how to don/doff PPE with droplet precautions

9
4
5
2

0.57
0.18
0.09
0.06

6*
4
6*
6

O1
O2
O3
O4

Operations
Operations
Operations
Operations

Common areas and changing rooms are cleaned frequently
Aerosolizing procedures are avoided (e.g. intubation, anesthesia)
Eliminate use of ABC breathing device
All immobilization devices stored in single use plastic bags

9
8
8
7

0.56
0.50
0.50
0.47

6*
5
1
5

C1

Symptomatic or
COVID + patients
Symptomatic or
COVID + patients
Symptomatic or
COVID + patients
Symptomatic or
COVID + patients
Symptomatic or
COVID + patients
Symptomatic or
COVID + patients

If aerosolizing procedure must be used then airborne precautions are observed.
Room is kept clear for 6 air exchanges post treatment
Staff observe droplet precautions during treatment (gown, surgical mask, face
shield, gloves)
Patients treated on one machine at the end of the day. Cleaning afterwards.

2

0.10

4

2

0.08

5

2

0.06

5

R&V system has a pop-up alert for COVID + patients

2

0.06

4

Patients get a mask when they come in and are treated with it on. Patients are
escorted in by nurse and kept separate.
Taking a COVID + patient off precautions requires two negative tests at least 24
hour apart

1

0.03

6

1

0.01

4

C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

patients
patients
patients
patients
patients
patients
patients
patients
patients

Fig. 3. Institutional consensus for the control measures listed in Table 2.

to inform the use of control measures, as the earliest control measures were not necessarily the most impactful.
For the highest-scoring failure modes, control measures and
interventions reduced the risk score (Fig. 2). However, in some
cases, the RPN stayed the same or increased slightly. Many of these
(5/11) were related to telehealth visits. As telehealth is a new technology, it is not surprising that we found that this control measure
could increase risk. We have not, as a medical community, had
time to fully and effectively implement this technology. In the
future, telehealth visits can be improved by providing more support to patients around the technology, coordinating with staff

ing. These measures are important because asymptomatic carriers,
unlike those experiencing symptoms, are difficult to identify. For
symptomatic patients or staff there are many other ‘‘levers to pull”
to reduce risk because the risk is more apparent. With symptomatic patients, treatment can occur in a dedicated room and/or
a dedicated time of day and staff can employ isolation precautions.
It is also interesting to recognize that control measures were
implemented in a rolling fashion as the pandemic evolved
(Fig. 1). Some of the most effective measures were only implemented relatively later (e.g. requiring staff to wear masks). This
underscores the importance of having a framework, such as FMEA,
5
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[40]. As such, the practice of waiting for 2 negative nasopharyngeal
swabs has been phased out at many locations. Second, as a risk
assessment methodology FMEA is known to have limitations in
terms of bias and variability which means that results are only
semi-quantitative. Finally, this study was performed at a point in
time when the response to COVID-19 is still evolving and the
results reflect the status of the pandemic at present. If, for example,
the stress on the healthcare system were to increase and the system become overwhelmed the risk equation may be different. This
study examined risks associated with COVID-19 in the oncology
setting. Common control measures were found to reduce the risk
associated with unintended viral transmission as well as potential
gaps introduced in the quality of care. However, the use of these
control measures varied across institutions due to the prevalence
of the virus and individualized responses in different practice environments. The failures modes identified in this analysis and the
effectiveness of current control measures can be used as a framework for assessing new policies and procedures as oncology clinics
continue to adapt to the pandemic.

and improving quality at the physician’s end. These improvements
may include more rigorous training on how to use telehealth apps
effectively, ensuring that all relevant health information is collected, and addressing state licensure barriers. Telehealth technology and access also present issues with regard to disparities of care
due to differing socioeconomic status of patient. The other control
measures which did not reduce RPN were related to decreased onsite staffing and failure to treat patients for a greater public health
concern. The rapid pandemic evolution resulted in staff members
working remotely without much time for preparation, and this
has been a learning process for all departments engaging in this.
Overall there appears to be some benefit to remote work [36]
and it is notable that these failure modes were given low RPN
scores. Although the holding of treatment for COVID-19 testing
may not benefit the individual patient quality of care, the benefits
to staff and other patients are substantial.
Unlike the data on failure mode, the results of control measures
showed variability between institutions. There was high institutional agreement (greater than 4 institutions) for only 47% of control measures. This may be a reflection of the diverse geographical
locations of these practices and the fact that different regions experienced different COVID-19 case numbers during the pandemic. Of
note, most of the control measures which had high compliance in
the April 2020 ASTRO survey [22] (asterisks in Table 2) also had
high institutional agreement in the present study, with the exception of limiting visitors. Interestingly, we found that the control
measures with the highest institutional agreement also had the
highest relative risk reduction (Fig. 3). This indicates that widespread actions taken by many departments were perceived to be
the most impactful, although some low consensus actions did have
a high impact. One example was one center’s policy on limiting the
use of the active breathing coordinator as a motion management
strategy. While this had a high impact score at one institution, similar devices were not in use at the other institutions. This lack of
consensus seems to be due to an equipment difference rather than
a philosophical difference. For the six institutions involved, large
changes to practice such as increased hypofractionation schedules
[23,37,38] or adaptations to patient QA [39] were not made. These
changes were considered at one institution if the typical standard
of care could not be met (e.g. multiple staff members unable to
work, physicians called to assist in other parts of the hospital)
but were avoided, as sudden changes in operational procedures
are frequently sources of error.
The findings of this study will continue to be important as the
pandemic evolves over what is expected to be many months. Work
patterns will likely continue to change and new control measures
will be introduced. The results of this study as well as the methodological framework may provide a rational way to assess the
potential impact on care delivery.
There are several limitations of the study. First, participants
included a relatively small number of institutions and all were
from the United States. These results, therefore, may not be applicable to all practices. The practices involved in this FMEA all had
different community viral prevalence, as well as different equipment, so not all control measures were felt to be necessary at all
sites. For instance, pre-RT COVID-19 testing as a control measure
had poor consensus, and this could be due to baseline community
viral prevalence, as well as regional variances in the availability of
testing materials. Additionally, the control measures practices of
these institutions was a snap shot in time, and given the exponential growth of the virus in hard hit communities, practice patterns
can change quickly. We sampled all practices within a one week
period to minimize the impact of this, although this pandemic
has been marked by rapid informational change. For instance, since
the start of this project, it is now felt that viral shedding can continue weeks after infection, but may not pose a transmission risk
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